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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AccRE'l'!oN-TrrLI~ 'tO Ntw LAND.-Certain lots in Section 31 bounded on
one side by a river and on the opposite side by a section line were slowly
eaten away and submerged by the action of the water. By this process the
river was carried beyond the section line into Section 30 onto the land of P.
After a time the river again shifted and gradually restored P's land and
built new land in Section 31 where the above mentioned lots had been. As
against D who had acquired tax deeds to the new land in Section 31. P
brought action to quiet title. Held, P had no rights in the new land in Section 31. Allard v. Curran (So. Dak., 1918), 168 N. W. 761.
P's contention was based on the theory that his land having become riparian by the shifting of the river he was entitled to accretions added thereto
as an incident of riparian ownership. There is authority for such view.
Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292; Peuker v. Canter, 62 Kan. 363; Widdecombe
v. Chiles, 173 Mo. 195. The contrary view is indicated by Gilbert v. Eldridge,
47 Minn. 210; Ocean City As.fn. v. Shriver, 64 N. J. L. 550; Hempstead v.
Lawrence, 70 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 52. In Volca1iic Oil & Gas Co. v. Chaplin,
27 Ont. L. Rep. 34 (1912), the court after reviewing the English and American cases decided in favor of the view expressed in the latter group of cases.
See 26 HARV. L. R£v. 185; 29 LAW Q. R£v. 3. Where a boundary is fixed by
the location of a body of water the line may very well be a shifting one as
the water recedes or encroaches, but where the boundary is a line in its very
nature fixed and unshiftable, as a section line, wholly different considerations
arise. The court in the principal case appreciated the disi:inction. See also
Cook v. McClure, 58 N. Y. 437.

ASSAUL'r AND BA'.1'1'£RY-S£r.F DEF£NSE.-In an action for assattlt and battery for damages by H against C, the plaintiff recovered judgment for $150.
C pleaded self-defense, and asked the court to instruct the jury "that a person in the lawful defense of his person does not have to wait until his antagonist assaulted him, but that he has the right to bring on the :fight if from
the actions at the time it shall reasonably appear to him that his antagonist
is about to assault him, although the person so assaulted may have had no
unlawful intent in his actions; and you are charged that you must look at
this from the standpoint of the person about to be assaulted." This was refused. Held, properly refused. Chapman v. Hargrove (1918), - Tex. Civ.
App. -, 204 S. W. 379.
The court says: "To justify a defensive assault provoked by deceptive
appearances the defendant must show not only a situation which creates a
reasonable apprehension of danger to himself, but one for wliich the assaulted
party is culpably responsible"; also the rule is different in civil suits from
that in criminal prosecutions. The facts are not set forth, and no authority
is cited for this conclusion. Moreover the conclusion seems to be in direct
conflict with Dallas &c. R. Co. v. Pettit (1907), 47 Tex. Civ. App. 354, 105 S.
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W. -12; Couruoisierv. Raymond (1896), 23 Colo. IIJ, 47 Pac. R. 284; Nr.w Orleans &c. R. Co. v. lopes (18g1), 142 U. S. 18, 12 S. Ct. 109, 35 L. Ed. 919;
Zell v. Du1111away (19rr), 115 Md. 1, 8o Atl. R. 215. See on the subject of

self-defense, DICEY, LAW 011 THS CONSTITUTION, 8th Ed. Note IV, pp. 48g-497.
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-ANTI-TIPPING ST'ATUTS.-Action was brought on a
writ of habeas. corpus to test the validity of a California statute (Laws of
1917, ch. 172) which declared it a misdemeanor for any employer to require
or accept from an employee, as a condition of the employment, any part of
the tips received by such employee. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional as an unwarranted interference with the right of contract. E:r parte
Farbe (Cal., 1918), 174 Pac. 320.
The majority of the· court were of the opinion that the statute would not
conduce to the elimination of the: custom of tipping, which the court admitted
was an evil whose eradication is desirable. No authority was cited except
upon the general matter of restriction of contract. It has been held that tips
turned over to an employer', in the mistaken belief that he demanded them,
could be recovered by the emplo.yee. Polites v. Barlin, 149 Ky. 376; Zappas v.
R(JUmeliote, 156 Iowa 709. Tips. may- be included as part of one's earnings,
under the workman's compensation acts, Sloat v. Rochester Taxi Co., 163 N.
Y. S. 91>4; Gt. Western Ry. Co. v. Helps, (H. of L.) 1918, A. C. 141. A statute of Mississippi prohibiting the acceptance of tips, and forbidding employers to. allow tippin~. was assumed to be constitutional in State v. Angelo,
109 Miss. 624, and State v. So. Ry. Co., 112 Miss. ZJ, although the indictments
in both cases were dismissed on other grounds. A Tennessee statute (Laws
of 1915, ch. 185) appears. never to- have been passed on.
CoNSTITUTIONAI. l.Aw-RA<:a-SSGB!CATION ORDINANcts.-Plaintiffs sued to
enjoin the City of Atlanta: from carrying on criminal prosecutions under the
city ordinance providing for race segregation. Held, injunction i;hould issue.
Glwer v. City of Atlanta (Ga., 1918), g6 S. E. 526.
A similar ordinance was passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 6o, and declared unconstitutionat
For a. discussion of that decision see 16 MICH. L. Rsv. 109, and 31 HARV. L.
~. 475. The Georgia supreme court had held the ordinance valid in Hardel$
v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248. In the instant case, however, it declared itself bound by the decision of the Supreme Court and reversed its original
opinion.
EguITY-]VRISDIC'tlON 'l'O CANCEL WHSRS LSGAi. DSFSNS!t E."<ISTS.-A contract for advertising services for twelve months was superseded by another
contract for sixty months, which was procured through. misrepresentation
that the term was. only: twelve months. In a suit to reform or cancel the
second contract, held. that equity has jurisdiction although the defense of
fraud could be made- at law. Smit•Atuten1u1hl Co. v. Jersey Railwa.ys Adtlerftsmg Co. (N. J. Ch., 1918), 103 Atl..388.
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Cancellation, except where there is some independent ground of equitable
jurisdiction, must rest upon the quia timet principle. Theoretically if an instrument makes a prima facie case against the complainant, the fact that he
has a legal defence does not oust the jurisdiction of equity; for the legal
defence may become seriously prejudiced or even dissipated before he has
opportunity to present it. Hence it is commonly recognized that the existence of a legal defence is not a bar to suit in equity . Bu~ton v Broadway,
45 Conn. 540; Fuller v. Percival, 126 Mass. 381; Metler v. Metler, 18 N. J.
Eq. 270, 19 N. J. Eq. 457. The courts of New York have taken a different
position. If a legal defence exists the complainant is told that he has adequate protection through perpetuating the testimony of his witnesses. Allerton v. Belden, 49 N. Y. 373. Perpetuation of testimony, however is but a
poor substitute for the actual witness and is unavailable if the witness remains in the jurisdiction. Yet it is common experience that witnesses forget. The undesirability of allowing the holder of an instrument to delay litigation and vex the maker at a remote period was recognized in McHenry v.
Hazard, 45 N. Y. 580, but in Fowler v. Palmer, 62 N. Y. 533, the doctrine
of Allert01i v. Belde1i was reaffirmed and it is still followed in New York.
Den11in v. Powers, g6 Misc. 252. The principal case is sound on principle
and finds general support in authority.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-NEGATrn CoNTRACT-!NJUNC'tION.-S. entered into a written contract with the complainant, to serve it as editorial writer and
have charge of the editorial page of the New York Tribu11e for four years.
As part of his undertaking S. covenanted that he would not "write for or
contribute to any other publication or periodical" during the term of the
agreement. S. broke his contract and entered into an agreement with the
McClure Syndicate for a series of articles. Complainant brought suit for
an i11junction. Backes, V. C., granted an injunction restraining S. from
writing for any paper other than the New York Tribune. Tribune Associaticn v. Simonds, et al. (N. J. Ch., 1918), 104 Atl. 386.
Mr. Frank H. Simonds, editorial ~riter for the New York Tribune and
defendant in the principal case, has at last achieved distinction by breach of
contract. He now belongs to the noble company of which Napoleon Lajoie, Annette Kellerman, and Mlle. Wagner (of blessed memory) are the
bright particular stars. The seal of judicial approval is placed upon his
unique quality. There is no other writer upon the war who can replace him,
and damages however weighty can not compensate his employer. Thus
Backes, V. C. It is true that the Vice-chancellor did not accept without
qualification counsel's extravagant appraisal of Mr. Simonds, when in one
ecstatic moment he said, "The loss to the world of Mr. Simonds's articles
would be equal to that of the Huns entering Paris." But Mr. Simonds is
unique, extraordinary, irreplacable, sui generis. His road to judicial fame
was short if rugged. Though his first effort to obtain recognition in the
courts was coldly received (Kennerly v. Simonds, 247 Fed. 822, 16 MICH. L.
~v. 647), he was not discouraged. Perseverance brings its own reward.
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E:ugit monumentllm aere perennius. For with the fall of brass in Berlin,
who shall say that the New Jersey chancery reports will not outwear the
most solemn "monument"?
STATE JURISDICTION OVER SOLDn;RS.-Defendant, regularly enlisted, and
acting as a dispatch driver, in the United States Naval Reserves, stationed
at Newport, the headquarters of the second naval district, was arrested for
exceeding the statutory speed limit of motor vehicles, in delivering a dispatch,
under specific instructions of his superior officer to proceed with all possible
dispatch, in an urgent matter pertaining to the conduct of the war between
tlfe United States and Germany; the naval forces stationed there were in
control of the adjoining waters, and were charged with guarding the coasts
from possible attacks. The lower state court certified the question of liability to the Supreme Court which held, Defendant not liable. State v. Burton (1918), - R. I.-, 103 Atl. R. 9(52.
The court says the conduct of the war rests wholly in the Federal Government. Any state law interfering therewith, or with the officers charged with
prosecuting the war, is suspended for the time being. The plans of the naval
authorities for the furtherance of that purpose cannot be obstructed by the
enforcement of such state regulations. Federal officers cannot be prevented
from performing their lawful duties by state laws or courts, without right to
relief by the Federal Courts, since the Federal laws are paramount. Cohensv.
Virginia (1821) 6 Wheat 264; Tennessee v. Davis (1879), 100 U. S. 257;
In re Neagle (1889), 135 U. S. I. Those in the military and naval service of
the United States, while in the lawful performance of their duties are within
this rule. United States v. Clark (1887), 31 Fed. 710; In re Fair (1900), 100
Fed. 149; Ex parte Schlaffer (1907), 154 Fed. 921; fore Walzer (1916), 235
Fed. 362, Ann. Cas. 1917 A-274- On the other hand an officer or soldier is
not exempt from civil or criminal liability just because he is such officer, nor
under a claim of performance of duty, if that is a mere subterfuge to evade
liability. In re Waite (1897), 81 Fed. 359, 370. In time of peace the Federal Courts will not interfere with the prosecution of persons in the military
service, in the State courts, for violation of State laws, unless they are at the
time engaged in the actual performance of their duties as soldiers. United
States v. Lewis (1906), 200 U. S. l, 26 S. C. 229; but compare, E~ Parle,
Bright (1874), 1 Utah 145· In England, the military is strictly subordinate
to the civil power, and an officer, or a soldier under command of an officer,
acts strictly at his peril, and is liable for the violation of the law,-"be hanged
if he obeys, and be shot if he does not obey," if he violates the civil laws.
DICEY. LAW oF THE CONSTITUTION, 8th Ed., pp. 297-302; notes pp. 512, 538;
BATY & MoRGAN, WiUt, ITS CONDUCT & RESULTS, p. 147 et seq. In this country there is conflict among recent opinions. See Commonwealth v. Shortall
(1903), 2o6 Pa. St. 165, g8 Am. St. R. 759, 65 L. R. A. 193. and Franks v.
Smith (19n). 142 Ky. 232, Ann. Cas. 1912 D-319. See Notes Ann. Cas. 1917
C, pp. 9-27; L. R. A. 1917, B-702.

